INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of commercial aviation, the right to take off and land and has been allocated on a first-come first-served basis with scarcely any coordination between carriers and/or airport management. 1 Over the years, as air traffic increased and major airports became congested, access to their runways has become increasingly difficult.
2 Beginning in the late 1960s, long queues of airplanes waiting on taxiways or in holding areas to take off or land became a common sight at major international airports during peak times.
3 This, in turn, resulted in serious inefficiencies in carriers' air operations. 4 In response to this situation, the notion of a 'slot' was developed. 5 A slot amounts to the right to use a runway at a specified time on a specified day. 6 The capacity of each airport -the total number of slots per daydepends on a large number of technical, safety and environmental factors such DOI: 10.2478 DOI: 10. /wrlae-2013 4 ibid. 5 ibid, Stainland (n 2) 163. 6 Typically this interval of time reserved for the arrival or departure of a flight becomes associated with a particular flight operation. While the notion is largely constructed around the right to take off and land (usage of the runway) it could also encompass rights to use a variety of other resources necessary for airlines to operate at an airport. Rights to these other non-runway capacities could be of importance where airport users are facing infrastructurerelated constraints that would negatively impact the ability to use runway rights, such as terminal capacity.
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Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics [Vol 3:1 as the need to provide spacing between aircraft, etc. 7 However, the most critical factor is, unsurprisingly, the total number of active runways at a given airport. Runways are indeed 'a rare commodity'. Construction of a runway itself is very expensive as it requires extensive technical and electronic infrastructure as well as the application of advanced technologies and the use of high quality materials. 8 Furthermore, as planning procedures becoming increasingly rigorous and local residents and environmental activists, who are typically fiercely opposed to such construction, become better organized and more outspoken, the process of construction is slowed significantly and can take many years (in no small part due to legal challenges). 9 As a result, the number of slots at any given airport is relatively rigid, while demand for them is constantly on the rise. 10 In other words, airport capacity is a bottleneck for air traffic.
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In order to develop and sustain an efficient, non-discriminatory system for rationing available slots, a few crucial questions must be addressed. Should slots be allocated by way of commercial (monetary) transactions, or be allotted freely? Who should be responsible for this allocation -a public regulator or private entity? Who should have the first claim on available slots -well-established carriers or new entrants? On the eve of reform of the European Union's (EU) slot distribution system it is also vital to explore various alternative possibilities (either administrative or market-based) based on experiences with the current system and its shortcomings. 12 The point of departure for this analysis is an overview of the 7 For details see Amadeo Odoni Richard de Neufville, Airport Systems: Planning, Design, and Management (McGraw-Hill 2003) and Alexander T Wells (ed), Airport Planning & Management (McGraw-Hill 1996 The allocation mechanism is based on the following principles: slots are allocated for free to carriers, which in turn pay airport charges only upon effective usage of a given slot. 24 An air carrier which continuously and effectively uses a given slot for a season (reference period) is entitled to claim that slot in the next equivalent season, 25 thus acquiring so-called 'grandfather rights '. 26 All remaining slots are put into a 'slot pool', 27 half of which must be allocated to 'new entrants'. 28 A new entrant is an air carrier requesting slots at an airport on any day and holding or having been allocated fewer than four slots at that airport on that day, or an operator requesting slots for non-stop service between two EU airports where at most two other carriers operate a direct service between those airports or airport systems on that day and holding or having been allocated fewer than four slots at that airport on that day for that non-stop service. 29 The above is provided that in both cases the air carriers do not hold more than 3% of the total daily slots at a given airport or more than 2% of the total slots throughout an airport system of which that airport forms part. 30 A new entrant who has been offered slots within two hours of the requested time but declines the offer loses its 'new entrant' status. 31 The remaining slots should be allocated in a 'neutral, nondiscriminatory and transparent' manner. 32 If it is not possible to meet all demands, preference must be given to commercial air services (at the expense of general aviation) and in particular to scheduled and programmed nonscheduled operations. 33 In other circumstances allocation is at the coordinator's discretion. 30 As per Regulation 95/93 (Article 2 h), an airport system is defined as two or more airports grouped together and serving the same city or conurbation. The identification of an airport within a given urban area became problematic when low-cost carriers began using more distant (from metropolitan areas) airports such as Brussels-Charleroi, Vitoria-Gasteiz (Bilbao) or Paris-Beauvais. The chief concern is how to classify these airports. The question boils down to the issue of whether the air services of low-cost carriers could be regarded as competition for those offered by full-service operators; this would imply that airports serviced by both categories of carriers would be regarded as parts of one system. See Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, [1997] As mentioned before, slots are allocated free of charge, and under current rules the sale of these slots is not allowed. However, the slots in question may be 'freely exchanged between air carriers or transferred by air carriers from one route, or type of service, to another, by mutual agreement or as a result of a total or partial take-over or unilaterally '. 35 This somewhat ambiguous provision raises concerns regarding the legal status of a slot. 36 The matter boils down to the question of who actually owns a slot -the Member State, the airport or the air carriers themselves? 37 The European Commission (EC) consistently argues that the rights of air carriers over slots is limited only to the right of usage and do not amount to property rights. 38 For example, former competition commissioner Karel Van Miert openly stated that runway slots are public property and regarded airlines' operations as a public service. 39 Under this approach, airport slots would represent nothing more than a temporary utilization licence. 40 This would mean that airlines may only exchange slots and not transfer them, since transfer implies ownership while exchange is merely redistribution. 41 In light of this reasoning, it remains unclear whether exchange may incorporate a monetary element and be conducted following a 'slot for slot-plus-cash' manner.
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This issue came to the fore in the British Airways/American Airlines (I) case where in the event of conclusion of a proposed alliance the incumbent 'owner' of the transferred slots would receive financial compensation. 43 The alliance failed to materialize, so neither the EC nor European Court of Justice (ECJ) had the opportunity to deliver an authoritative response to the question 35 44 This lex lacunae effectively creates a 'grey market' for trade in slots where commercially valuable slots (usually these in peak hours) are exchanged for less attractive ones (off-peak). 45 The Commission's requirement for exchange was thus formally met while at the same time the beneficiary reaped substantial profit. 46 The genesis of this debate regarding the legal status of a slot is glaringly obvious, as it boils down to who should benefit from the income generated by the potential sale of slots (the airport, a third party, the public regulator, etc.).
47 This decision will always be a fundamentally political one, as it could be used as a tool for achieving policy-defined fiscal objectives.
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At the same time, the choice of beneficiary would have a significant impact on the overall structure of the market. For example, if the profits from slot trading are handed over to airports, they will have little incentive to increase capacity as they would not want to lose income from the existing slots whose scarcity results in premium prices. 49 Even if one assumes that increases in capacity would be financed from the public purse, the subsequent larger scale of operations (and possible overcapacity) may not be as profitable as a situation in which demand exceeds supply 50 . In other words, this system would constitute the establishment of a de facto fiscal monopoly, which is prohibited under the so-called 'standstill clause'.
51 Also, a situation when a State retains the authority to 'sell' slots may -depending on the State concerned -be susceptible to corruption without a guarantee that incumbents could not push competitors out of the market.
52
With these considerations in mind, the following logic of the current mechanism emerges: the incentive of competition is lost, since there is no real 44 The proposed alliance had raised serious concerns regarding its dominance over transAtlantic hub-to-hub operations (chiefly London-Heathrow -Chicago; London- Gatwick 52 The relationship between the state (regulator) and various commercial actors, especially in a situation when transfers of public funds are involved, is particularly prone to the occurrence of a situation called 'State Capture'. This essentially describes cases when certain undertakings are able to shape the rules of the game to their advantage through illicit and non-transparent measures.
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link between the commercial value of a given slot as measured by the time of day to which it is assigned (broadly, peak hours mean higher profits) and the actual investment by the airline to acquire it. So, from the incumbent's perspective, the simple retention of slots itself is desirable so as to block potential competitors. In other words, conditions are favourable to anticompetitive practices. 53 However, the current system addresses these concerns by providing a mechanism to prevent the withholding of unused slots. This will be discussed in the next section.
III. GRANDFATHER RIGHTS AND "USE-IT-OR-LOSE-IT" RULE
The air transport industry was traditionally shielded from the full impact of EU competition rules. 54 This changed after Nouvelles Frontiéres, nevertheless many flag carriers inherited privileged positions at their home airports. 55 The focus of competition authorities was shifted to scrutinizing the behaviour of these established airlines for "concerted practices" and abuses of "dominant position". 56 In other words (as mentioned in the previous paragraph), the system is prone to situations in which incumbent operators retain slots so as to stop new competitors from entering the market.
This anti-competitive behaviour has been further augmented by a block exemption establishing so-called 'grandfather rights' (historical precedence). 57 If an incumbent carrier operates its slots with a utilization rate at 80% or above during the summer (April to October) or winter scheduling (reference) period, it is entitled to the same slots in the equivalent scheduling period of the following year.
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As a remedy for the concerns regarding potential anti-competitive abuse of 'grandfather rights', the notion of 'Use-it-or-lose-it' was 53 See in this context analysis in infra (n 122). 54 56 The issue of concentration at selected EU and US network hubs clearly demonstrates the privileged position of flag carriers at their home airports in comparison to the following two leading carriers: Amsterdam Schipol (AMS); KLM -50.7%, Transavia -5.3%, easyJet -3.5%; Munich (MUC); Lufthansa -64%, dba -7.8%, Air France -1.8%; Paris Orly (ORY); Air France -61.3%, Iberia -7.5%, easyJet -5.6%; Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG); Air France -57.9%, Lufthansa -5.2%, British Airways -4%; Frankfurt (FRA); Lufthansa -60.1%, British Airways -3.2%, Condor -2.3%; Milan Malpensa (MXP); Alitalia -59.1%, Lufthansa -7.1%, Air France 3.6%; London (LHR); British Airways -42.3%, BMI -11.5%, Lufthansa -4.5%; Madrid Barajas (MAD); Iberia -56.7%, Spanair -13.7%, Air Europa -6.8%. In the USA there are no national carriers as there are in the EU, but the same mechanism applies to the status of large airlines at their home airports. established. 59 Under this rule, slots that are used less than the aforementioned 80% of the time in a given season are deemed to have been forfeited and must be returned to the 'pool'. 60 In addition, a Member State may withhold slots from the pool provided they are required for domestic services of significance to regional economic development.
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From the standpoint of long-term strategic planning, the current system of slot precedence is certainly beneficial.
62 However, it is encumbered with a serious drawback, as it does not foster allocative efficiency. 63 The general logic of the system does not ensure that slots reach the operators with the lowest costs.
64 Quite the opposite is true, as it creates an opportunity for incumbents to squeeze their more efficient competitors out of the market.
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This is an issue inseparable from that of slot trading, for if one assumes that an air carrier's willingness to pay for a given slot reflects the net increase in profit they are able to reap from that slot, efficiency would require that a slot goes to the operator who is prepared to offer the highest price for it. 66 However, since monetary trading of slots is not officially endorsed (although the previous paragraph showed the existence of a 'grey market' for such activities), the system will not guarantee that slot holders are those carriers for which the slots have the most value. In other words, the system offers no incentives to transfer slots to more efficient competitors. provides that to take into account the special characteristics and constraints of the outermost regions, in particular their remoteness, insularity and small size, and the need to properly link them with the central regions, Member States may impose a Public Service Obligation in respect of scheduled air services between an airport in the EU and an airport serving a peripheral or development region in its territory or on a thin route to any airport on its territory any such route being considered vital for the economic and social development of the region which the airport serves. Primarily the entrusted operator is required to offer a minimum daily service frequency and/or number of seats. There are often specific timetabling requirements with which the carrier must comply. On PSOs see further inter alia Ulla Neergaard, 'Services of General Economic Interest: The Nature of the Beast' in Markus Krajewski, Ulla Neergaard and Johan Van de Gronden (eds) On the contrary, from the incumbent's perspective it constitutes a sound business decision to withhold a slot under their from entering the pool in order to thwart a competitor's (new entrant) expansion on a given market.
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One may suppose that maintaining loss-generating operations just to ensure a slot's utilization (which is a conditio sine qua non for retaining that slot) may be a better choice -from a business perspective -for an incumbent airline than to let a new entrant into a given airport.
69 This is all the more so true considering that historical precedence usually covers peak-time slots, allowing for operations in convenient hours which, in turn, is reflected in profit earned. 70 Thus airlines which would have to surrender slots would resort to 'hoarding' and rearrange their schedules in order to give up slots with the lowest commercial value.
71
This is the main reason why the trade-off between the interests of incumbents and those of new entrants encapsulated in the 'use-it-or-lose-it' rule has failed to fulfil its mission, as it secures an insufficient number of slots for new entrants to begin truly competitive operations.
72 This is particularly so when considering, as previously mentioned, that these 'forfeited' slots (returned to the pool) are usually off-peak -early in the morning or late at night -which makes connections less competitive.
73 Therefore, despite the declared raison d'être of the current system, new entrants usually begin their operations from less favourably placed slots which, in turn, has a negative impact on the overall competitiveness of the market. 69 In the case of large network carriers, income from each particular route should never be assessed individually, in isolation from other connections in the carrier's entire network. The total network forms an interrelated cohesive structure and the overall profitability of this network should be the main concern, not its individual parts. This is especially the case if these secondary routes provide feeder service for the primary revenue-generating connections. See infra (n 81). 70 John Balfour, 'Some Lessons from the European Experience', (1995) XX AASL 497. 71 Stainland (n 2) 177. 72 ibid. For example, at London Heathrow airport at the time of introduction of the current slot distribution system (1993), out of a total 7558 slots of weekly capacity 94.7 per cent were covered by the grandfather rule. After one year only 35 slots (7 per cent) were returned to the pool under the 'use-it-or-lose-it' rule. 73 Balfour (n 69) 497-508. 74 ibid. The lack of slots is not a real entry barrier but their virtually non-existent commercial value is. So-called 'moonlight slots' are slots that are commercially useless because they 
IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR REFORM -ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The aforementioned system has been criticized for such deficiencies as leading to sub-optimal slot allocation. Taking into account experiences with the current system, on the eve of its reform it is worth exploring some alternative regulatory approaches to the issue under examination.
a) Auctioning
Possible solutions to the slot trading problem constitute the point of departure for this analysis. The first of the discussed options will be the mechanism of slot auctioning. Under this system, airlines would be able to purchase slots on the basis of the best price offer. 75 Essentially this means that a slot would go to the carrier willing to offer the highest price. Of course this approach would (at least in principle) presume that slots are indeed property rights and that selling them would imply full transfer of their ownership to airlines. 76 Furthermore, an auctioning system raises serious concerns on both practical and political grounds. 77 One may argue that such a system creates the risk that new entrants would be outbid by incumbent operators as the difference in bidding power between major flag carriers and de novo entrants would allow for such practices. 78 At the same time, these risks could be mitigated by phasing in the auction process, with only a certain percentage of slots being auctioned each year (each reference period).
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While the general logic behind the auction mechanism is simple, the choice of particular method is not. The prime objective of slot auctioning is allocative efficiency, but one must also take into account the specifics of airline operations in respect of schedule planning. The chief issue that emerges here is the so-called 'aggregation problem'. 80 In a nutshell, from the airlines' perspective certain combinations of slots have a higher value than sum of the individual values of each of these slots.
81 This is especially important for carriers operating under the hub-and-spoke system in which securing specific slots is vital for creating the synergy effect necessary in the grant a right to take-off or land at times where there is no demand for the air services in question, i.e. during off-peak periods late at night (at 'moonlight') or at weekends. An airline therefore can always apply for a moonlight slot with the intention to merely use it as 'bait' for a slot trade with another airline. Kilian (n 45) 25€7. 75 In economics, an auction is a process of buying and/or selling goods or services by offering them up for a bid and may refer to any specified mechanism (Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, (2 nd edn, Elsevier 2010)). In this paper the term 'auction' will be used in this broad sense unless explicitly linked to a specific mechanism under discussion. 76 While the basic economic logic of an auction implies the existence of a property right on a given asset, it is also entirely possible to regard slots as a temporary utilization licence (of a runway integration of the arrival and departures network (and sustaining hub-andspoke operations). 82 In the case of the simplest method of auctioning, which could be described as 'one slot-one auction', achieving this synergy would be next to impossible and would result in the system effectively dismantling all hub-and-spoke operations, while depriving the market of the predictability and continuity of the current grandfathering system. 83 For these reasons, a simple system of separate auctions for individual slots would fail to ensure allocative efficiency. 84 In a dynamically interdependent environment (air transport has a tendency to foster oligopoly) one may also argue that the demise of cohesive networks would be detrimental to consumers/passengers.
One of the possible solutions to address these concerns and, to a certain extent, alleviate the aggregation problem is the Vickrey auction (otherwise known as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves system). 85 This system is designed to ensure equilibrium between efficient allocations of certain goods (slots) regardless of the information held by each bidder about competitorsparticularly about their bidding power. In practice this mechanism works as follows: each bidder submits a complete list of valuations, one for each possible bundle of items. In the next step, the auctioneer determines the most efficient allocation on the basis of the submitted values.
86 Then, the bidders are requested to pay the opportunity cost for their participation, which effectively means they are to pay the difference between the value of the efficient allocation that would have been selected if the submitted value had equalled zero for all bundles and the value that the other bidders obtain under the efficient allocation selected by the auctioneer upon considering all 82 The hub-and-spoke system (distribution paradigm) in air transport is based on a system of large airports, hubs. Put simply, a passenger wishing to journey from point A to point B uses a regional airline (feeder) to reach the nearest hub, from which travel then continues to the hub closest to the destination. The passenger then uses a regional airline to reach that destination. Compared to a point-to-point network of n nodes, in a hub-and-spoke system only n -1 routes are required to reach the same number of destinations. This is because the upper bound is x -1, and the complexity is 0(x), which compares favourably to the ( −1) 2 routes on 0(n 2 ) required to connect every point in the network (in the case of 10 points the hub-and-spoke model would require 9 routes, while the alternative point-to-point approach 45). Most major carriers operate according to this model, although the majority of the heavily hub-oriented carriers in fact apply a hybrid model which includes a limited number of point-to-point services not connected with a hub. Of course one must also take into account a multitude of other demand-related, technical, etc. considerations in setting up a route network, so the final shape of a network goes beyond factors related merely to the number of flights necessary to connect all airports in a given system. For details see inter alia Peter Belobaba, 'The Airline Planning Process' in Belobaba, Odoni and Barnhart (n 3) reports. 87 In other words, the buying party pays what it costs the others by taking part in the auction.
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From the regulator's perspective, this system offers a serious advantage as one of its main features is the possibility to impose distribution constraints which may be indispensable in achieving policy-defined goals.
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Assuming certain restrictions (for example, that specific slots should be allotted to certain categories of carriers) are in place, operators will still be well-advised to submit bids that are equal to their true values, and the payment will be calculated as the optimum value under that constraint.
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Another possible mechanism for slot auctioning is the so-called clockproxy auction (Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy).
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This mechanism consists of two phases: a clock auction and a proxy auction. It combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the former with the efficiency of the latter.
92 Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy phase to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. 93 This procedure is constructed as follows: in the first step -the clock phase -the auctioneer announces prices for slots, and the bidders (airlines) respond with the number of slots they want in each time window (day, week etc.) . 94 The prices of licenses for time windows where demand for licenses exceeds supply are then increased (up to the total supply level), and a new round begins. 95 This phase ends when no excess demand remains for 87 ibid. 88 ibid. This sealed-bid auction is based on the following principles: a set of auctioned slots M = {t1,…,tm} and a set of bidders (airlines) N = {b1,…,bm}. Now assuming is the social value of the discussed auction (for a certain combination). An airline b1 which wins the slot tj will pay \{ } -\{ } \{ } (social cost of the winning party is thus incurred by the other bidders). Any set of bidders other than bi is N \ {bi}. In every situation when a given slot (tj) becomes available, these carriers would attain welfare \{ } . Every auction resulting in sale of a slot to a certain bidder bi would reduce the total number of available assets to M \ {tj} and change the attainable welfare to \{ } \{ } . The winner will pay the difference between these two welfare values. This winner (who has value A) could thus derive the following utility (for slot tj) A -( \{ } -\{ } \{ } ).
89 Gruyer and Lenoir (n 47). 90 One must also take into account the following factor: in order to calculate payment it is necessary to determine for each buyer acquiring a slot what the optimum allocation (under given constraints) would be if that buyer had not taken part in the auction, which in a realworld situation could be problematic. any time window. 96 The raison d'ětre of this step is to facilitate price discovery, as well as to remove the exposure problem, that is the risk of bidders paying an excessive price for a slot that is of no use without its complement slot (typical in the case of hub-and-spoke operations).
97 By the end of the clock phase, airlines would be able to estimate the commercial value of each particular slot.
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The clock phase is followed by a proxy phase. 99 Each carrier determines the value of slots it are interested in and then reports these values to a proxy agent. 100 The proxy bids for the airline in an ascending package auction as follows: the proxy determines in round X the potential profit for every possible bid using the reported values. 101 The proxy then submits a bid corresponding to the maximum potential profit. 102 The proxy round ends when no new bids are submitted. 103 This phase is designed to counter the possibility of demand reduction or collusion as a result of the clock phase and 96 In each round t, the price vector p t = { 1 ,…, } associated price with each asset is the price for slot Sj in round t. Bidders submit bids ∈ ℤ ≥0 in each round. The clock round ends when demand is smaller than supply. 97 Ausubel, Milgrom and Crompton (n 94) 17. The exposure problem typically appears when a buyer with complementary valuations bids to acquire a set (bundle) of assets (slots) sold in sequence during independent auctions. In typical sector-related situations, when a hub-andspoke carrier (supra n 81) seeks to obtain a certain combination of slots (which are sold separately) it faces the exposure problem as it requires this particular combination of slots to achieve the synergy effect indispensable for network cohesion. The core (L, w) is the set of all imputations of π which are payoffs imputed to the bidders based on allocations that are feasible for the coalition as a whole. This could not be blocked by any coalition S. That is for any coalition ∑ ( ) ≥ ( ).
∈
Therefore the proxy phase offers two main advantages: efficiency and competitive revenues for the seller. Ausubel, Milgrom and Crompton (n 94) 9.
to promote efficiency. 104 In other words, the proxy phase allows for safe bidding for synergies which are indispensable to hub-and-spoke operations.
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The third option of relevance here is a first-price package auction (combinatorial auction). 106 The underlying principle of this system is that an airline submits bids for a certain number of slots (a package) but it only pays when it gets them all.
107 This is the simplest auction mechanism, which essentially operates on an "all or nothing" basis. 108 As mentioned before, the value of a certain combination of slots to network carriers is much higher than the combined value of an equal number of individual slots.
109 For these operators the "all or nothing" principle in the slot acquisition process serves as a tool for maintaining network cohesion and integrity. 110 In this system, determining the winning bidder can be a complex process under which the party with the highest individual bid is not necessarily guaranteed to win. 'ownership' (assuming that slots indeed amount to a property right) for the purposes of the primary allocation of slots need not prevent the definition of tradable rights in slots and legitimising a secondary market. Tradable rights short of "freehold" rights could be defined and efficiency gains realised through secondary trading. In a competitive market slots ought to move to those who value them the most irrespective of their initial allocation. The issue of "ownership" and any distribution of the rent lying behind slot rights should thus be considered as a separate policy decision. ultimate result will be efficient regardless of the initial allocation. 113 Under the current system, in which assets (slots) are given away for free, no financial impact assessment prior to slot acquisition is required on the side of airlines. To put it bluntly, since carriers are not paying they have no interest in obtaining only those slots which they would use effectively. Unused slots return to the pool at the end of a given reference period without any financial downside for their previous holders. This inefficient allocation is harmful to the overall competitiveness of the market as unused slots could be put (at least potentially) into better use by competitors and/or new entrants.
114 Commercialization of slot trading means the purchasing party will be required to give information about their own valuations through pricing, which in turn would establish a properly-constituted market, especially when all transactions are publicly registered. 115 The argument goes that regardless of how slots are initially allotted (for example, by a coordinator), in the case of secondary trading efficiency will be attained in any case. 116 Airlines will sell slots that are unused or that generate insufficient revenue.
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While the underlying economic rationale behind the secondary trading system is valid, certain sector-specific factors reduce the practical feasibility of this system. Exchanges with optimal efficiency do not occur in situations of asymmetric information which are unavoidable in real-world scenarios. which usually owes its position to the pre-liberalization conditions. 120 The risk is that airline may use its superior financial power (compared to that of other operators) to engage in predatory behavior by pre-empting the entry of slots into the market. 121 In other words, the system allows for a greater scope of anti-competitive behavior on the part incumbent operators. 122 However, data regarding slot usage at the most heavily congested airport in the US shows that the pattern of behavior displayed by dominant airlines usually reflects the pursuit of effectiveness in slot usage rather than anti-competitive practices. 123 One must also take into account that higher fares of dominant airlines may not necessarily be a result of infringement of competition rules, but may be the net result of diseconomies of scale in other network operating costs associated with the operations of a given airline. 124 In other words, the overall pattern of behavior of a dominant carrier depends on a multitude of factors (e.g. inter-airport competition, route dominances), so it seems farfetched to conclude that the secondary trading system generates anticompetitive behavior. 125 Therefore, notwithstanding the aforementioned shortcomings, experiences with secondary markets (from the USA and UK) indicate that they indeed yield rather positive results. 126 The data shows that this system is, to a certain extent, able to foster competition and facilitate new entries. high-quality products and off-peak flights as low-quality products.
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According to this line of reasoning, such a system will ensure that the prices of air services will reflect the commercial value of the slots they are associated with, in turn guaranteeing efficient usage of slots.
139
The main shortcoming of this system lies in the fact that competitive equilibrium of prices only exists when slots are substitutes for all airlines. 140 In real-world conditions, certain combination of slots are complementary for some airlines (especially hub-and-spoke operators) but substitutes for others. 141 It also seems unrealistic that airport management or regulators will have adequate information in each reference period to compute market clearing prices. 142 The pricing scheme will perform its task only when values are known in advance while the quantity available is unknown, as market mechanisms will determine the latter. 143 In the case discussed here, the total number of available slots is fully known in advance while their values for the airlines (the maximum price carriers will be willing to pay) are not. 144 In other words, the system is prone to the occurrence of two possible scenarios, both of which would generate suboptimal results (deficiencies). 145 In the former, if the price threshold is set at an inadequate level (too low), it will fail to deliver the expected result of leveling demand between peak and off-peak. The additional costs associated with operations during the tolled period in this case would simply be insufficiently high for carriers to rearrange their schedules, 146 while in the latter case, if congestion charges are set at excessive levels, in extreme cases carriers may even withdraw from a given airport.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the manner in which the EU's present slot allocation system functions clearly shows that it has failed to sufficiently address the associated problems. This is chiefly due to insufficient numbers of slots being returned to the pool for distribution to new entrants. Also, one may criticize lex lacunae in the field of secondary trading, as airport congestion and the associated service disruptions continue to grow, causing constantly increasing losses to airlines and the whole European economy. Yet despite widespread recognition of the shortcomings of the current slot allocation system, the parties involved have failed to reach a consensus on how to reform it. This lack of agreement regarding measures that should be adopted to ameliorate the slot allocation problem is the result of a multitude of essentially political factors. Each of the discussed proposals has its advantages and drawbacks for various interest groups involved in the decision-making process: airlines, local residents, airport management, etc. Therefore, gaining political support for a given solution would require striking a fine balance between the interests of these diverse parties. This practical consideration means that the final revised slot regulation will have to go beyond purely economic considerations of efficiency. In other words, a certain trade-off between conflicting policy goals is inevitable. Thus the focus should not be put on finding an optimal solution, but rather the workable 'second-best' -one that would receive the necessary political backing.
Apart from all these factors, another layer which adds to the complexity of the problem is the competition policy issue. Without going into an in-depth analysis which is beyond the scope of this paper, responsible lawmaking has to take into account several key considerations. First and foremost among them is safeguarding against exploitation of market power by incumbent carriers, both during auctions and secondary trading. This scrutiny must encompass both anti-competitive behavior (e.g. abuse of dominant position, concerted practices) as well as mergers and acquisitions (those involving redistribution of slots). Since slot allocation has a monetary element, the question of compatibility with state aid rules emerges, both for the funding of regular slot purchases and those with Public Service Obligations (PSO) imposed. However, even if one could brush these considerations aside and ignore policy-defined constraints, there would still be no clear-cut answer as to which of the discussed alternative approaches would best resolve the slot conundrum. Since a significant increase in airport capacity is not a viable option for many reasons that were outlined at the beginning of this paper (while it would be the single best solution), after giving the matter due consideration a system mixing secondary trading with level of competition between airports. Therefore, for apparent reasons, for most of the fullservice carriers there are no viable alternatives to major hub airports. But the level of airport charges at these airports is the primary reason why low cost airlines operate form airports of secondary importance which naturally offer lower fees. See also: Sean D Barret, Deregulation and the Airline Business in Europe: Selected Readings (Routledge 2009) 120; G Germà Bel, Xavier Fageda, 'Privatisation, regulation and airport pricing: an empirical analysis for Europe' (2010) 37 Journal of Regulatory Economics 142.
